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ABSTRACT: While unmanned aerial systems can serve as a
force multiplier for militants, these systems do not embody a
transformation in modern insurgent warfare or enable militants
to engage regularly in strategic coercion. Instead, drone use is
consistent with a militant group’s relative capabilities and broader
strategic objectives. Consequently, these groups are likely to employ
drones primarily for theater and tactical military purposes.

D

rones provide militants with affordable and novel means
of bringing force to bear against opponents as the cost and
complexity of this technology decreases and range, lethality,
and swarming ability increases. A simple cost-benefit analysis suggests
many militant groups should be attracted to making drones a central part
of their armory. This framework, however, overlooks important strategic
and political considerations, the sum of which strongly suggest most
militant groups have determined drone-based airpower does not enable
them to engage successfully in strategic coercion in civil war. Instead,
drones serve as tactical adjuncts to the existing military strategies of
militant groups and are used primarily to support ground operations and
to interfere with the military operations of opponents.

Background

Over the past decade, state and nonstate actors alike have
substantially increased their production and militarized use of
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—drones.1 The refinement and
proliferation of affordable UAS technology has prompted more militant
groups to incorporate drones into their military and political operations.
For instance, militants have introduced drones to armed conflicts in
Ukraine, Nigeria, Indonesia, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Expressing concern
about this trend, a May 2019 United Nations report advised, “greater
efforts are needed to address the potential risks posed by terrorist use of
UAS.”2 US defense and political leaders have echoed this call.3
Mitigating the risks posed by such drone use is complicated by the
lack of agreement among experts and practitioners regarding the nature
1. Secretary General, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS), Cir 328 AN/190 (Montreal: ICAO, 2011), x, https://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS
/Documents/Circular%20328_en.pdf.
2. United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
(CTED), Greater Efforts Needed to Address the Potential Risks Posed by Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, CTED Trends Alert (New York: CTED, May 2019), 1, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp
-content/uploads/2019/05/CTED-UAS-Trends-Alert-Final_17_May_2019.pdf.
3. Michelle Tan, “Army Chief: Soldiers Must Be Ready to Fight in ‘Megacities’,” Defense
News, October 5, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2016/10/05
/army-chief-soldiers-must-be-ready-to-fight-in-megacities/.
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of the threat posed by militant drone programs. Some assessments
raise alarm. “Imagine swarms of undersea, surface, and aerial drones
hunting submarines hidden in the vastness of the ocean. Or imagine
hundreds of airborne drones darting through New York City, seeking
out targets and dosing them with nerve agent.”4 In 2017, then chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. remarked
to a Senate committee that drones were “at the top of [the US defense
community’s] list for current emerging threats.”5 Others, however, have
expressed less concern.6
How and to what extent do militants advance their strategic
objectives with drones? Drawing on Robert Pape’s categories of
coercive airpower, this article presents a framework for assessing
militant drone operations and their effects in armed conflicts.7 The
analysis focuses primarily on drone operations conducted by Islamic
State, Hezbollah, and Houthi militants as these groups are especially
prominent among the few nonstate organizations known to have used
drones to kill opponents.8

Appeal of Drone Technologies
Two types of drones are available to militants. The first type
resembles an airframe that can carry a human crew—a fixed-wing, longerrange aircraft that can remain aloft for hours. These drones are equipped
with satellite uplinks for long-distance communication, sophisticated
surveillance systems, and sizeable payloads for guided missiles. Only a
few militant groups, most prominently Hezbollah and the Houthis, have
employed drones with some or all of these characteristics. The second
type resembles a hobbyist drone—small, portable, and limited in range
and payload. This type of drone has been used more widely by militant
groups such as Islamic State.
Yet technological and political developments are rapidly blurring
this distinction and may allow many militant groups to obtain drones
capable of strategic effects. Commercial outlets are producing larger
4. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and
the Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future
-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/.
5. Ash Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups: Exploring Variation in Adoption,” Defense &
Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (2018): 113–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478183.
6. Dhia Muhsin, “Houthi Use of Drones Delivers Potent Message in Yemen War,” International
Institute of Strategic Studies (blog), August 27, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/08
/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen.
7. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 46.
8. Emil Archambault and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Drone Imagery in Islamic State
Propaganda: Flying Like a State,” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 2020): 955–73, https://doi
.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa014; and Don Rassler, Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive
Technology (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2016), https://ctc
.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Drones-Report.pdf.
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drone systems with wider operative radii and heavier payloads.9 Swarm
technology continues to improve and is becoming accessible to amateur
operators and militant groups.10 This particular technology could
enhance militant groups’ use of drones for strategic ends, allowing them
to coordinate strikes among many small, inexpensive, and expendable
drones to create physical and psychological effects.11
The number of states producing and exporting drones is growing
rapidly. States as diverse as Belarus, Iran, and Indonesia produce
indigenous drone systems, and many other states import these types of
weapons.12 This proliferation could facilitate militant groups’ acquisition
of drones through a number of channels.
States that produce drones might provide them to militant
organizations to further their foreign policy objectives: Iran, for
example, has been accused of giving Hezbollah and the Houthis access
to sophisticated, long-range drone systems. Drones are widely traded on
international markets, allowing militant organizations to purchase them
legally or illicitly. Moreover, the diffusion of knowledge about drone
production allows militants to produce drones themselves or modify
unarmed drones to carry weapons.13
The urban battlespace also lends itself to drone use. Many experts,
including US defense leaders, expect the frequency of urban warfare
to increase worldwide.14 The urban terrain limits or removes many
obstacles that otherwise characterize drone operations. For example,
militants operating in an urban setting are less concerned about drones’
limited flight range.15 Drones are well-suited to the urban environment.
They are more difficult to detect and are naturally designed to avoid
physical obstacles that might inhibit a small tactical unit, vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device, or armed convoy. Some observers warn
personnel operating in urban conflicts that “the development of large
9. T. X. Hammes, “The Future of Warfare: Small, Many, Smart vs. Few & Exquisite?” War
on the Rocks, July 16, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the-future-of-warfare-small
-many-smart-vs-few-exquisite/.
10. Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need
to Be Ready for It,” Modern War Institute, October 25, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu
/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready/.
11. Robert J. Bunker, Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military
Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015), 25.
12. Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Organization 71, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 397–418; Michael C.
Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate
over Drone Proliferation,” International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 7–42; and Peter Bergen, Melissa
Salyk-Virk, and David Sterman, “Who Has What: Countries Developing Armed Drones,” in World
of Drones database (Washington, DC: New America, July 2020), https://www.newamerica.org
/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-developing-armed-drones/.
13. Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats (West Point, NY:
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2018), 22, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf.
14. Tan, “Ready to Fight.”
15. Scott Stewart, “Beyond the Buzz: Assessing the Terrorist Drone Threat,” Stratfor, February 9,
2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/beyond-buzz-assessing-terrorist-drone-threat.
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and capable suicidal drones needs to be considered as the next probable
successor to suicide bombing.”16
These developments mean more militant groups have the capacity
to obtain more sophisticated drones. From an operational standpoint,
these systems offer a number of advantages. First, drones are easier to
operate than many advanced weapons systems such as cruise missiles or
fixed-wing aircraft. The technology underlying units from commercial
retailers—a basic airframe, computing power, and communication
capabilities—is not complex and is widely available. The larger drones
used in the September 2019 attacks on the Saudi Aramco facilities in
Khurais and Abqaiq are estimated to have cost only $15,000 or less to
build.17 This expenditure is comparable to the expense of assembling
a suicide car bomb—between $13,000 and $20,000.18 Further, these
systems obligate opposing forces to expend resources on developing
drone countermeasures, which have faced many challenges.19
Operating larger, fixed-wing drones often requires more extensive
training from experts. For example, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps and Hezbollah embedded long-term advisers in Yemen to train
Houthi members to operate such systems.20 But for militant groups
committed to projecting airpower, these drones offer an accessible
alternative compared to piloting, maintaining, and basing conventional
aircraft. The absence of an onboard crew means militants risk fewer
human resources when deploying these systems. This aspect of drones
is especially appealing to armed nonstate actors who compete against
larger and more capable government forces and must carefully husband
their current and future recruits.21
Second, drones offer militants an opportunity to engage targets
that would be too risky to attack or surveil with ground forces.22 While
militant forces may not have the capacity to launch a successful ground
16. Craig Whiteside and Vera Mironova, “Adaptation and Innovation with an Urban
Twist: Changes to Suicide Tactics in the Battle for Mosul,” Military Review (November–December
2017): 84, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives
/November-December-2017/Adaptation-and-Innovation-with-an-Urban-Twist-Changes-to
-Suicide-Tactics-in-the-Battle-for-Mosul/.
17. Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz, and Stanley Reed, “Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by
Drone Strike, and US Blames Iran,” New York Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html.
18. Dina Temple-Raston, “How Much Does a Terrorist Attack Cost? A Lot Less Than You’d
Think,” NPR, June 25, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/25/325240653
/how-much-does-a-terrorist-attack-cost-a-lot-less-than-you-think.
19. Arthur Holland Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Center for the
Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2019), https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2019/12/CSD
-CUAS-2nd-Edition-Web.pdf.
20. Eric Schmitt, “Iran Is Smuggling Increasingly Potent Weapons into Yemen, US Admiral
Says,” New York Times, September 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world
/middleeast/iran-houthis-fifth-fleet-admiral.html.
21. Desirée Nilsson, “Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple Rebel
Groups and Negotiated Settlements,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 3 (July 2010):
253–71.
22. James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, Drones and Support for the Use of Force (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2018).
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assault into a neighboring country, drones make surveilling or attacking
these territories feasible.23

Coercive Logic of Militant Drone Use

How and to what extent do militants use drones to advance their
strategic objectives? Speaking to interstate relations, the “advent of
airpower quite literally added a whole new dimension to the possibilities
for coercion.”24 Does the emergence of drone technologies offer a
similar watershed moment to militant actors? “Coercion” is the “art of
manipulating the costs and benefits to affect the behavior of an actor.”25
Using this definition, how might militant groups use drones to erode
their opponent’s will to fight and convince their opponent to make
concessions or suffer the costs of coercion?26
Armed actors can use airpower to coerce their opponents in
multiple ways. Pape’s discussion of airpower in interstate conflict identifies
meaningful differences in militants’ applications of drone systems.
While armed drones may be used to execute tactical, operational, or
strategic missions, this article focuses on the intended strategic results
of drone-based missions and assesses the capacity for strategic coercion
presented by militants’ use of drones. By design, strategic effects impair
the adversary’s ability to carry out war or hostilities and should neutralize
the adversary’s centers of gravity.27
Pape first distinguishes between strategic bombing and theater
air attacks.28 Actors in armed conflicts use strategic bombing to coerce
opponents in two ways—denial and punishment. In a denial strategy,
airpower targets the opponent’s capacity to develop and deploy military
forces, weakening it sufficiently to allow ground forces to seize territory.
Actors use denial strategies to “dissuade an adversary by convincing them
that any military campaign they may launch will fail militarily because
the coercer will deny the ability to complete the action successfully.”29
Toward this end, the coercer could threaten to capture territory held
by the opponent or threaten to destroy enough of the opponent’s military
power to thwart its territorial ambitions.30 Denial involves the direct and
23. Brian A. Jackson et al., Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
Cruise Missiles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 37–42.
24. Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas
National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream
/handle/2152/81862/TNSRVol3Issue2.pdf ?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
25. Alexander B. Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success
and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in
International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press,
2018), 96.
26. Pape, Bombing to Win, 46; and US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, March 2013): I-4.
27. US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 (Montgomery, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center
for Doctrine Development and Education, March 10, 2021), 6, https://www.doctrine.af.mil
/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1/AFDP-1.pdf.
28. Pape, Bombing to Win, 46.
29. Biddle, “Coercion Theory,” 109.
30. Pape, Bombing to Win, 14.
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large-scale destruction of enemy war-fighting units and personnel with
a goal to undermine fundamentally an adversary’s capacity to fight and
to force that adversary to make strategic concessions. In a punishment
strategy, enemy civilians are deliberately targeted to lower morale,
leading them to press their government to end the conflict.
Actors use theater air attacks to coerce the enemy in two ways
as well: interdiction and close air support. An interdiction strategy
seeks to destroy “logistic networks, reinforcements, and command
headquarters behind front lines,” and its goal is to “stop the movement
and coordination of forces throughout the theater.”31 A close air
support strategy involves supporting the military actions of ground
troops by providing cover against enemy airpower, engaging in tactical
surveillance, and targeting enemy forces in support of ground forces.
The following four categories provide a framework to investigate the
coercive capacity of militant drone operations.

Denial
Militants can use armed drones to attack opposing military bases
and over-the-horizon forces without exposing their personnel to harm.
Houthi forces, for example, regularly used drones to surveil and attack
Saudi- and UAE-led coalition forces outside of Yemen. Similarly in
July 2006, Hezbollah used a military-grade drone to disable an Israeli
warship. Following the attack, group leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah
warned Israeli officials, “you wanted an open war and we are ready for
an open war.”32
With or without drones, strategic denial is a tall order for militant
organizations, which almost always have fewer materiel capabilities
than their state-based opponents. Yet some militants do seem to use
drones for this purpose. Announcements by the Houthis demonstrate
they consider drone attacks to fit within the group’s broader “Balance
of Deterrence” initiative—an explicit reference to a core principle of
coercion theory.33 For instance, after claiming responsibility for the
September 2019 attacks on the Saudi Aramco facility, the Houthis
capitalized on the event to coerce Emirati forces. A Houthi military
spokesperson stated: “to the Emirati regime we say only one operation
[of ours] would cost you dearly. . . . Today and for the first time we
announce that we have dozens of targets within our range in the UAE,
some are in Abu Dhabi and can be attacked at any time.”34
These types of attacks, designed to deny the coalition forces, will
likely continue. In a limited but growing number of cases, militants have
used drones to deny the advancement of other militants. For example
31. Pape, Bombing to Win, 77.
32. Hamza Hendawi, “Israel: Hezbollah Drone Attacks Warship,” Washington Post, July 14, 2006.
33. Rawan Shaif, “Saudi Arabia’s Self-Fulfilling Houthi Prophecy,” Foreign Policy, October 2,
2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/02/saudi-arabias-self-fulfilling-houthi-prophecy/.
34. Aziz El Yaakoubi, Maher Chmaytelli, and Tuqa Khalid, “Yemen’s Houthis Threaten to
Attack United Arab Emirates Targets,” Reuters, September 18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-saudi-aramco-houthis-emirates-idUSKBN1W3282.
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in August 2017, Hezbollah used armed drones to strike Islamic State
forces in Syria close to the border with Lebanon, demonstrating the
broader application of this technology by militant groups.35 Hezbollah,
which boasts the longest-standing drone program among militant
groups, seems to focus its lethal drone operations on members of other
nonstate actor groups, namely Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. Its
drone operations against Israeli government forces, by contrast, have
been largely nonkinetic.36
This distinction between drone strikes against state opponents and
against rivals suggests few militants might use armed drones in true
denial strategies against the former, such as striking strategic targets at
the opponent’s center of gravity. Compared with government forces,
most militants operate on the short end of the capability ratio; drones
do not give militants an upper hand in this regard. On the whole,
militant organizations, such as the Houthis, that possess sophisticated
drone systems have a greater baseline opportunity to achieve strategic
denial, however, they have not used their drone fleets to shift conflicts
fundamentally in their favor.
This pattern of use is unlikely to change, even with advancements
in drone-based technologies. Militants’ ability to use drones for strategic
effect, especially for purposes of denial, against state opponents is
limited by logistical and materiel factors. Strategic coercion involves
widespread and sustained attacks on an opponent’s centers of gravity.
Militant groups would need to control enough territory to house fleets
of drones and their support operations, such as intelligence collection
and analysis, repair facilities, and bases for drone operators.
Moreover, this infrastructure would need to be safe from attack—
and resources would have to be diverted to protect this infrastructure.
Only militant groups in a position to challenge the state more effectively
with other military means could consider using drones for denial. Even
capable militant groups such as Hezbollah lack elements needed to use
drones for strategic denial; in this sense, they are fundamentally different
from most states with modern military capabilities and command and
control systems.
Relative weakness leads militant groups to husband their resources
and deploy them to maximize their survival, wearing down opponents
instead of trying to win through decisive battlefield victories. This is
the fundamental political strategy of most militant groups, large or
small. This strategy would also apply to a decision about whether to
invest in large-drone capabilities—capabilities that create vulnerabilities
as previously discussed. As such, militants will unlikely try to develop
drone capabilities for the purpose of strategic denial.
35. Angus McDowall, “Hezbollah Uses Drones against Islamic State in Syria: Hezbollah-Run
Media,” Reuters, August 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria
/hezbollah-uses-drones-against-islamic-state-in-syria-hezbollah-run-media-idUSKCN1B11H4.
36. Archambault and Veilleux-Lepage, “Drone Imagery,” 13.
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Punishment
Militants may attack soft targets as part of a punishment strategy.
Coercion by punishment intentionally raises costs or risks to civilian
populations, which subsequently pressures officials to back down or
make concessions. And militant drone operations have indeed caused
civilian casualties. Yet the Houthis’ drone attacks on soft targets in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen—intended to advance the group’s political objectives
by exposing the Yemeni government’s inability to defend its territory
and by exerting political pressure on the Saudi government to limit its
activities—have focused more on targeting critical infrastructure.37
Notably on June 14, 2019, the Houthis released a poster directed at Saudi
and Emirati civilians that cautioned, “for your safety, avoid airports and
military locations.”38 They began a sustained strike campaign against
Saudi regional airports that same week.
This example illustrates a broader point: militant organizations
thus far have shown a lack of will rather than a lack of capacity to use
drones systematically in punishment strategies. This fact is welcome but
perplexing: even smaller drones offer a seemingly surefire way to incite
fear among noncombatant populations. Indeed, many who express
concerns about the use of drones in this context draw attention to the
potential of these weapons to disrupt airport operations, attack large
groups of civilians, or assassinate political leaders.
While small armed drones cannot kill many people, they could
create widespread fear and lead to abrupt changes in public behavior. Yet
this sort of attack seems to be quite rare, even for groups that otherwise
target civilians, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State, and is consistent
with Pape’s findings about the ineffectiveness of using airpower to target
civilians in interstate conflicts.39
Why is this the case? Militant groups may have concluded other
armaments are better suited for the task. Suicide bombing, for example,
signals resolve and capacity.40 Relatedly, a number of militant groups
understand counterinsurgent air strikes kill civilians and have leveraged
this data for propaganda purposes. They may refrain from using drones
to target civilians in order to enhance this narrative. Indeed, one can
imagine such attacks might backfire: this type of drone strike might lead
the group’s enemy, a regime for example, to devote more resources to the
fight; it might also cause the civilian population in question to rally around
37. “Several Killed in Houthi Missile, Drone Attack: Yemeni Officials,” Al Jazeera,
November 7, 2019.
38. Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Houthi Drone Strikes in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,” Long War
Journal, August 7, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/08/analysis-houthi-drone
-strikes-in-saudi-arabia-and-yemen.php.
39. Pape, Bombing to Win, 10.
40. Bruce Hoffmann and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide
Attack,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 (2004): 243–81, https://doi.org/10.1080
/10576100490466498.
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the regime. For these reasons, militant groups that engage in terrorism
using drones are less likely to achieve their larger political objectives.41

Interdiction
Coercive militant force also may be used for interdiction purposes,
weakening enemy battlefield forces by starving them of needed
logistical support. Strikes against civilian airports, factories, and similar
targets serve the strategic purpose of threatening command centers, arms
depots, or logistical staging hubs. In some cases, these strikes undermine
critical sources of economic revenue.42 The only militant group to have
carried out such drone operations systematically is the Houthis. Since
April 2018, the group has conducted a steady stream of drone strikes
against airports, munitions warehouses, oil production facilities, and
arms depots in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.43

Figure 1. Houthi rebel drone and missile attacks, 2018–19

Starting in April 2018, the Houthis executed 115 drone attacks
through October 2019 (figure 1).44 Of these attacks, 62 were conducted
against civilian airports or critical infrastructure, and 27 were conducted
against military bases or troops.45 The remaining 26 attacks were
reported as intercepted or as striking unknown targets. By comparison,
Houthi forces conducted 45 attacks with ballistic missiles against
military bases and/or military troops and only 20 attacks against civilian
airports or critical infrastructure.
This analysis indicates the Houthi militants use their drone arsenal
for specific coercive purposes. Houthi drone operations strike softer
41. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006):
42–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137516?seq=1; and Virginia Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists
Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69, no. 3
(Summer 2015): 519–66, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization
/article/abs/do-terrorists-win-rebels-use-of-terrorism-and-civil-war-outcomes/4729B2B92690461
6190DC38DB3240C8F.
42. “Houthi Drone Attack ‘Hits Arms Depot’ at Saudi Airport in Najran,” Al Jazeera,
May 21, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/houthi-drone-attack-hits-arms-depot
-saudi-airport-najran-190521080525385.html.
43. Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
44. Data from Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
45. Weiss, “Houthi Drone Strikes.”
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targets rather than as part of a true denial strategy, while the group uses
its ballistic missiles to attack harder targets protected with air defense
systems that can more effectively intercept drones.
Overall, Houthi drone operations against soft targets disrupt
sources of logistical support for coalition military activity in Yemen.
These drone operations also demonstrate the group’s strength and
resolve while avoiding a potential rallying of the public around coalition
leadership triggered by mass civilian casualties from drone strikes.
The Houthis’ drone operations show mixed results in coercing
opponents. Drone operations against the Saudis—the group’s primary
opponent—have had limited success at the strategic level. A 2019 report
concludes, “ultimately, UAV use by [the Houthis] has not shifted the
strategic calculus of the Saudi-led coalition.”46 Indeed, while the Houthis
have recently gained ground, the Saudis have also not retreated. In terms
of successful coercion, the UAE completed the withdrawal of its forces
in Yemen in February 2020. While outright military victory against the
Houthis became less and less likely, this decision was also likely shaped
by the Houthis’ growing capacity and stated willingness to strike airports
and critical infrastructure within the Emirates.47

Close Air Support
Drones can also be used in theater air attacks to support groundforce operations, giving militants a combined arms capability. As Pape
describes it, “the purpose of close air support, which attacks frontline
fielded forces, is to thin the front, creating weak spots that the attacker’s
ground forces can exploit.”48 The best-known example of these types of
operations is Islamic State modifying unarmed drones—or engineering
their own—to carry small munitions in Iraq and Syria. Islamic State
effectively used its arsenal to disrupt coalition front lines in a number of
campaigns, including the Battle of Mosul.
Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters records 208 drone attacks conducted
by Islamic State in 2017 in Iraq and Syria (figure 2).49 In contrast to
the types of operations typical of the Houthis or Hezbollah, most
Islamic State drone strikes were tactical enhancements used in defense
of strategically valuable positions, focused on military vehicles and
troops in transit or active combat. Less than 5 percent of the group’s
2017 drone operations targeted critical infrastructure like information
centers or communication towers. All of the 2017 attacks occurred in
territories Islamic State controlled or defended in 2017, and more than
half occurred in the major battles in urban areas. While Islamic State
drone operations had relatively little strategic coercive effect, they have
often been quite operationally and tactically disruptive.
46. Muhsin, “Houthi Use of Drones.”
47. Ibrahim Jalal, “The UAE May Have Withdrawn from Yemen but Its Influence
Remains Strong,” Middle East Institute, February 25, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications
/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong.
48. Pape, Bombing to Win, 78.
49. Nick Waters, Drone Proliferation Database (Dropbox, 2018).
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Figure 2. ISIS drone strikes by target type, 2017

Close ground support operations can include nonkinetic approaches
as well. Interestingly, many militant groups with access to drones
choose not to arm them at all. Indeed, a larger number of armed groups
employ drones strictly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
purposes. For example in 2018, an official associated with the Air
Force Research Laboratory reported the Taliban had been using drones
extensively to monitor the location and movements of US troops.50
Islamic State’s West Africa Province in Nigeria has used drones to
collect tactical intelligence, plan more effective hit-and-run attacks, and
avoid surprise counterattacks. These drones are helpful for intelligence
collection against stationary targets but are less useful for supporting
attacks on small and mobile targets.51
Close air support presents one of the most fruitful areas for
expansion in militant drone programs. Homemade, commercial, and
military-grade units are all well suited for this purpose, meaning groups
without access to military-grade drones can still conduct ground
support operations effectively and on a systematic scale. In 2017, then
commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond A.
Thomas noted, “[the] most daunting problem [of 2016] was an adaptive
enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under
our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available
drones and fuel-expedient weapons systems, and our only available
response was small arms fire.”52
Indeed, Islamic State’s recorded use of drones mirrors Pape’s
assessment of how such operations can be carried out to optimal
effect. “The most important group support targets are point targets
50. Jared Keller, “The Taliban Are Watching US Troops with Drones ‘24/7’ in Afghanistan,”
Task & Purpose, December 14, 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com/bulletpoints/taliban-drone
-surveillance-afghanistan.
51. Jacob Zenn, “The Humanitarian Dilemma around the Military’s ‘Super Camp’ Strategy in
Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, Africa in Transition (blog) September 5, 2019, https://www
.cfr.org/blog/humanitarian-dilemma-around-militarys-super-camp-strategy-nigeria.
52. David B. Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones Were 2016’s ‘Most Daunting
Problem,’ ” Defense News, May 16, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic
/2017/05/16/socom-commander-armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem/.
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requiring direct hits: tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, bunkers used for communications, logistic storage, or other
purposes, and bridges.”53 While Islamic State’s drone operations did not,
ultimately, have a strategic coercive effect, the group demonstrated in
2016 and 2017 how drones could be used on the front lines to challenge
and deny—even temporarily—the advancement of better-equipped
opposing forces.

Conclusion

Some experts argue drones provide militants with a “poor man’s
air force,” enabling them to employ airpower as a central part of their
political-military strategies.54 Yet militant groups do not have powerful
reasons to use drones systematically for strategic bombing, such as
in denial or punishment strategies. Rather, they use these systems to
optimal effect in theater air attacks—especially in interdiction or closegroup support operations. A militant group’s drone program coincides
with its limited relative capabilities and broader strategic objectives.
Due to the rapid advancement and proliferation of drone systems, many
militant groups will soon have the capacity to acquire drones that would
allow strategic bombing. Most groups, however, will have little incentive
to do so.
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